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Germany currently finds itself in a difficult economic situation, one characterised not only by a
long period of weak economic growth, but also by developments that, if the necessary adjust-
ment processes are not accomplished, pose a threat to Germany’s medium-term growth pros-
pects.
In the international context the central challenges result from the following trends:
·  Changes in the framework of conditions for international trade (WTO agreements), which
offer new opportunities for the export sector, but can also be expected to intensify competi-
tion and thus the pressure for adjustment;
·  the transition in eastern Europe, the opening up of China and developments in Latin America,
all of which, on the one hand, offer new sales markets for German companies, but on the
other create new competitive relations and alternative locations for production and in-
vestment;
·  the trend towards globalisation, which is gradually dissolving traditional ties to production
locations.
In domestic economic terms the most urgent task is to reduce mass unemployment. An indis-
pensable pre-condition for this to be achieved is that the "catching-up process" in eastern Ger-
many continues. At the same time government finances must be consolidated in order to regain
the capacity for policy action.
There is general agreement that action urgently needs to be taken to meet these challenges.
Different views are put forward, though, with respect to the type of economic policy activities
required to ensure the successful adjustment of Germany as a production locations. A large
number of proposals for action are targeted towards an immediate and general reduction in the
costs of production in Germany. They relate, in particular, to reductions in the burden of wage
costs, taxes and social insurance contributions. These proposals are based on considerations
derived largely from supply-side theory.
The task of this report is to indicate the possible economic effects of such an economic policy
concept oriented towards cost-cutting. To this end the various proposed measures were con-
cretised and brought together in a "cost-cutting scenario". It is not the economic policy proposals- 5 -
of a specific party or interest group that have been examined with regard to their economic
effects; rather, we have attempted to capture the underlying philosophy, with a package of
measures that reflects the overall tenor of these proposals.
The quantitative paths were estimated on the basis of theoretical and empirical analyses, fo-
cusing particularly on the interrelationships between wage costs, investment and growth. Within
the framework of the DIW’s scenario model (Gornig et al. 1997), these partial results are col-
lated into a consistent overall picture of economic developments in an iterative process. Pro-
jections of demographic and labour supply trends are also tied in to this process.
In order to be able to evaluate the economic effects, the results of the cost-cutting scenario are
compared with those of a reference scenario that is based on proposals for measures targeted
towards a modernisation of the institutional and material infrastructure. Although one of the aims
of this strategy is also to reduce the burden of costs, this is achieved not by flat-rate cuts in
individual cost components, but rather by raising efficiency. In this line of argument, relatively
high levels in wages as well as in taxes and social insurance contributions can be seen as a
condition for increases in efficiency by means of improvements in qualitative production con-
ditions. The economic causal mechanisms of these policy measures, which are brought together
under the title of "integration scenario", and their depiction within the DIW scenario model have
already been described in detail elsewhere (DIW 1996b).- 6 -
 (OHPHQWVRIWKHWZRVWUDWHJLHV
The central element in a cost-cutting strategy is to reduce business costs. The main role is
played by a reduction in the burden of labour costs, achieved by means of wage moderation on
the part of workers, coupled with a reduction in indirect labour costs. It was assumed that in real
terms labour costs per employee remain constant in west Germany to the year 2010. This
means that wage growth is even slower than that demanded by the various calls that have been
made for real wage growth to follow a path below productivity growth. The European
Commission (EU 1993), for example, proposes a lag of one percentage point behind productivity
with the aim of expanding employment. The German Council of Economic Experts (SVR 1997)
calls for a lag of one half of a percentage point.
Alongside the decrease in the burden of wages and indirect wage costs, the tax burden is also
reduced. For unlike in the reference scenario, energy, as a production factor, is not subjected to
higher taxes, so that an important component of input costs will not increase (at least not for this
reason). In addition, firms can count on further reductions in the burden of taxes on profits,
although at a markedly reduced pace compared with the first half of the 1990s.
Reductions in the tax burden are not limited to the business sector. Employee households also
benefit from a cut in wage and income tax, so that the tax burden is reduced by almost one
percentage point of earned income by the year 2010. On the other hand, households face a two-
percentage-point increase in value added tax and an increase in the burden of social insurance
contributions, of which they must shoulder a greater proportion.
As a result of these measures, the share of government receipts on GDP is  almost three per-
centage points lower than in the reference scenario. In order to reduce the budget deficit as a
share of output, simultaneously government spending is cut back on a broad front. In real terms
government investment is frozen at its present level, while government consumption at constant
prices is limited to a marginal annual average rate of growth of just 0.2 per cent. Subsidies are
cut back drastically to just 1.2 per cent of GDP, and the level of many transfer benefits will be
raised significantly more slowly than in the past.
The Growth and Employment-Promotion Act has already indicated the direction in which the
financial pressure on the social insurance systems is to be reduced within the context of a cost-
cutting strategy (BfA 1996). One of the proposals is to raise the retirement age to 67, a strategy
accompanied by cuts in higher education studying times, in order to reduce the average age at- 7 -
which young people enter employment. Changes in the regulations for social benefits for those
with reduced capacity to work will make it much more difficult to claim such pensions.
The „integration scenario“, which serves as a reference model to the cost-cutting scenario, is
based on a comprehensive modernisation concept. It focuses on the renewal and development
of the institutional and material infrastructure. The aim of the modernisation strategy is to guar-
antee Germany's high level of social, technological and economic performance, while at the
same time creating greater scope for individual and plant-level solutions by rendering institu-
tional forms more flexible.
The central elements in the modernisation strategy are as follows:
·  an incomes policy that, while allowing for greater scope for plant-level exceptions, enables
broad sections of the workforce to participate in economic growth;
·  a working-time policy that, allowing for the different conditions prevailing in German enter-
prises, creates greater scope for a more equitable distribution of work;
·  an education policy appropriate to the increasingly highly differentiated skill requirements, by
strengthening initial and particularly continuing training;
·  an infrastructure policy that permanently improves the conditions for high-value production by
means of qualitative improvement and expansion;
·  a policy for eastern Germany that provides massive support for an adjustment to the condi-
tions and standards prevailing in west Germany, based on an orientation towards a further
capital intensification and a higher technological level.
Seen as a whole, this bundle of strategies relies upon government playing an active role in
improving the conditions for production in Germany. This cannot be achieved without additional
public spending and must, therefore, in many respects take precedence over current fiscal con-
straints.
The conversion of this strategy bundle into the quantitative figures required in order to calculate
the scenario relies on a large number of variables. In the case of real wage trends, for example,
an increase at an annual average rate of 1.5 per cent is assumed, that is at a similar rate to that
during the last 15 years in west Germany. It is assumed that the pace of working time reduction
accelerates slightly in comparison to past trends. The education and infrastructure policy
strategies are reflected in a marked increase in the rate of growth of overall factor productivity in- 8 -
the business sector. The supply of government services expands at an annual rate of around 3.5
per cent. The assumed strategy regarding the support policy for east Germany is concretised by,
among other things, virtually constant nominal spending on investment grants.- 9 -
 &DXVDOPHFKDQLVPV
The call for costs to be reduced is based on the expectation that this will provide impulses for
higher economic growth. This expectation relies on a number of causal relationships. It is ex-
pected, for example, that the desired reduction in the burden of wage and indirect wage costs -
coupled, in particular, with greater wage differentiation - will boost normal market production vis-
a-vis moonlighting and do-it-yourself activities.
Yet the expectations of higher growth are based in the first instance on causal mechanisms
within the production process. It is expected that reduced business costs will induce firms to
expand investment and thus to increase medium-term potential output and employment. If the
influence of cost-reducing measures on investment and employment is to be analysed system-
atically, it is necessary to distinguish between different analytical levels and causal relationships.
The first important distinction for the evaluation is between the micro- and macroeconomic level.
From the microeconomic perspective cost-reducing measures need to be divided into indirect
influences, which impact on investment via the profitability and cost situation of the plant as a
whole, and those effects related directly to the concrete investment calculation. The most
important mechanisms at the macroeconomic level are the feedback effects on the various
components of demand - not least government demand - resulting from changes in production
conditions. In addition, the impact of a cost-cutting strategy on changes in the supply of labour
are analysed.
 7KHGHWHUPLQDQWVRISULYDWHVHFWRULQYHVWPHQW
Profits are often seen as being the dominant factor determining investment activity by firms in so
far as it is oriented towards generating future profits. Starting from simplified macroeconomic
models it is frequently concluded that there is a very close relationship between investment and
profits.
Yet such theoretical considerations run counter to empirical findings. At the macroeconomic
level, and even more so at the microeconomic level, the relationship between profits and
investment is very loose. The rapid increase in business income and profits since 1994 have not
led to the rise in investment on which many had pinned their hopes. A comparison of annual
changes in profits and investment reveals little correlation. The contrast between the theoretical
models and the empirical findings can be explained primarily with reference to assumptions of
the model that do not accord with reality.- 10 -
In analysing the relationship between private sector investment and corporate profits, it is
important to recognise that in practice the latter are derived from various sources. It is only in
ideal-typical models that profits can be equated with the yield on capital as a production factor.
Those familiar with business practice are well aware that, while the production process is
certainly a pre-condition for earning profits, profits are influenced by a wide range of factors,
many of which have little to do with production. Firms’ willingness to take on debt in order to
finance additional investment depends decisively on their evaluation of the nature and the
source of the profits they are earning.
"Inflationary profits", i.e. those resulting from an unexpected rise in the price level, will be
considered by firms as "pseudo" profits. While they improve liquidity, they cannot be taken, of
themselves, as indicating an improvement in the firm’s sales position. Similarly, profits from
temporary cuts in the cost of production, for instance resulting from currency revaluation, falling
energy prices, or cyclically induced wage moderation, will not induce firms to invest in additional
productive capacity. It is only when firms are confident that profits are closely linked to the
utilisation of existing plant that it makes sense for them to expand their machine park. Figure 1
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Yet it is not always easy to recognise the sources of profits. Help comes in the form of a
decomposition procedure (DIW 1989) that divides annual changes in profits into a number of
components. Taking as a starting point gross income from entrepreneurial activity and property,
the annual change in profits there is decomposed into:
·  a sales component which indicates how profits would have changed, given constant unit
returns and unit costs, merely due to changes in the volume produced;- 11 -
·  a price-component which covers those influences resulting from the increase in the
general price level at an unchanged level of output, when unit costs increase at the
same rate as unit returns;
·  an interest-cost component, which covers the change in profits caused by changes in
the net interest burden of the business sector; and
·  a production-cost component relating to that proportion of the change in profits that, at
unchanged output and a given rise in unit returns, results solely from an increase in unit
costs differing from that in unit returns.
A regression analysis in which all four components were examined with respect to their influence
on investment identified a systematic influence only in the case of the sales component of
profits. For all the other profit components the parameters derived are not significant.
Figure 2 shows the annual rates of change of gross fixed capital formation, calculated in
dependence of the sales-related component of profits, alongside the corresponding actual
values. The degree of correlation of the two series is extraordinarily high, with an R² of 0.81. The
residual differences can be explained neither by way of the other profits components, i.e. the
interest-cost, production-cost or price components, nor with reference to long or short-run
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If the reduction in the cost burden is biased in favour of labour as a production factor, this may
lead to a job-creating restructuring of production processes. In view of technical rigidities,- 12 -
however, it must be assumed that the scope for restructuring existing production processes is
rather limited. Consequently, the adjustment to changes in relative factor prices generally occurs
only over the longer term, via the process of investing in new and scrapping old plant. At the
microeconomic level investment decisions are frequently based on a calculation approach in
which the costs of investment are determined by the sum of future discounted earnings. It is on
this microeconomic approach that the DIW’s capital-vintage model is based (Görzig 1985). In
terms of the model, this means that it is assumed that companies base their investment decision
on a neo-classical production function. Once an investment has been realised, relative factor
inputs remain constant. In such a putty-clay approach it is usually assumed that prices and price
expectations for the factors of production, and generally also sales expectations, are exogenous
to the firm. Future earnings are derived as the difference between the returns on sales and the
expected variable costs, primarily wage costs. An investment is utilised until the variable costs
exceed the returns.
If firms are assumed to be profit maximising within the framework of such a model, then the
level of investment simultaneously determines the optimal relationship between capital and the
associated jobs, and the optimal period of utilisation. If in the longer term a company expects
wage costs to rise more slowly, economic obsolescence of the investment will be postponed to
the future. The firm will be able to base its calculations on a longer effective plant life. As a result
the need for replacement investment will decline.
If wage costs are reduced, it makes sense for a company to design investment projects with a
given capacity effect in a less capital-intensive way. If a company can count on the lower wage
cost burden being maintained over the longer term, it will reduce its demand for investment
goods (given constant sales expectations). At the same time the demand for labour increases in
relative terms. In the short term the influence of this weakened pressure to substitute capital for
labour is likely to be minor. The "weight" of one year of investment relative to the machine park
already in place is simply too small. Calculations using the DIW's capital-vintage model, for
example, shows that in 1995 just 5 per cent of the total west German productive capacity was
accounted for by investment in plant during that year (Table 1).
In the longer term, however, the influence of the substitution process spreads to the entire
capital stock, and also exerts an influence on average labour and capital productivity. Gradually
the post-1995 investment accounts for a rising proportion of total productive potential. Assuming
medium-term investment growth of between 3 and 4 per cent, by the year 2010 75 per cent of
productive capacity would consist of post-1995 invested plant.- 13 -
Even so, the quantitative effects of such a restructuring of production processes should not be
overstated. Assuming a one percentage point reduction in the average rate of growth of real
wages in the coming years, average capital deployment per job would be just 7 per cent lower by
2010. Provided the reduced rate of wage-cost growth does not induce effects damaging to
corporate sales, after 15 years 3 to 4 per cent more jobs would be available by virtue of this
substitution effect. Initially the effect on the demand for labour is minor. The job-creating effects
increase over the observation period, making their full effect felt towards the end of the period.
This means that the demand for investment goods would decline to at least the same extent,
however. The macroeconomic wage bill would be reduced from the start of the period, on the
other hand, as the cost-reducing influences of the lower wage cost burden would take effect
before the job-creating impact of the resulting substitution effect begins to bite.
Moreover, given the initial reduction in wage income and the reduced demand for investment
over the longer term, it appears difficult to sustain the assumption that the reduction in the
burden of labour costs would have no effect on corporate sales. If, on one hand, the
macroeconomic wage bill declines in the wake of the easing of the labour-cost reduction,
coupled with the initially limited employment effect, private consumption can be expected to
expand less strongly. This has a damaging effect on firms’ sales expectations, on top of the
weakened demand for investment goods resulting from the substitution effect. In the absence of
other factors stimulating sales and compensating for these negative influences, firms must be






Stock at start of year Additions
in DM billions or thousands as a % of the stock
Gross fixed assets 5 791 309 5,3
Potential output 2 361 124 5,3
Employment 26 248 1 216 4,6
6RXUFH DIW calculations ',:- 14 -
When evaluating the impact of lower costs on sales, either via wage moderation or reduced
payments by business to the public sector, it is necessary to pay attention to the numerous
differences between the micro and macroeconomic perspectives. It is not infrequently the case
that determinants of investment activity that may be relevant for an individual company are
irrelevant at the macroeconomic level. Conversely, variables that play a significant role in the
macroeconomic discussion frequently have no direct influence on investment decisions at the
microeconomic level.
From a microeconomic perspective the assumption that cost reductions will have a positive
impact on investment and growth for a firm facing price competition seem immediately plausible.
Price competition means that a firm competes with other suppliers only with regard to the price
of the commodity on a market that is otherwise unlimited. Taking the isolated view of a single
firm, cost reductions would enable it to reduce its sales price. The additional demand for the
products of this company to which this gives rise lead to expanding output and employment
there. The firm increases its capacity utilisation. If the company had previously adjusted its
employment to the lower level of capacity utilisation, it will recruit additional labour, filling
positions that had previously been vacant due to inadequate sales. Additional jobs can also be
created by means of investment to expand productive capacity, if the company had been
operating at the limit of its capacity and is confident that the cost reduction and the resulting
competitive advantage are permanent in nature.
It is immediately obvious from the term "competitive advantage" that not all companies can win
in the struggle for market shares. If all the companies operating on a market enjoy cost
reductions, they cannot improve their price competitiveness. The mechanism whereby a cost
reduction for one group of companies is associated with an improvement in competitive position
only functions if there is another group of companies that does not benefit from cost-cutting
measures. In the context of a cost-cutting scenario based on a generalised reduction in costs in
Germany, this means that competitive advantages can only arise vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
Yet the growth impulses of an improved price competitiveness over the rest of the world should
not be overstated. Given flexible exchange rates, improvements in the international
competitiveness of German firms must be offset against the potential for a revaluation of the D-
Mark. A higher external value of the currency can nullify cost advantages in terms of wages or
taxes in international trade between price-competitive terms. Yet even when such exchange-
rates reactions  do not occur, or, as in a European monetary union, are not possible, domestic
wage moderation, for instance, does not necessarily bring about an improvement in international
price competitiveness. It must be assumed that, at least within the EU, German wage trends
serve as an indicator for other countries. If they, too, conclude moderate wage settlements,
Germany’s cost advantage over its most important trading partners melts away. The race to cut- 15 -
costs in this fashion can at best generate only temporary advantages in international price
competition.
The debate on the impact of cost reductions often focuses on the influence on firms’ investment
decisions. Yet this ignores the fact that, before investment occurs at all, any reductions in the
cost burden initially exert effects on the production currently under way. This production is being
realised using plants and machinery set in place in the course of prior investment activity.
Whether firms actually use the profits resulting from the reductions in the cost burden for
expansion, and thus for additional investment and the creation of new jobs, depends essentially
on the type of product market on which the firm operates.
In evaluating the investment and growth impulses emanating from an improved competitive
position, it must be taken into account that in Germany, as in other highly developed economies,
the proportion of output that is a subject to international price competition is much lower than in
other countries (DIW 1992). Rather, German companies have traditionally sought to concentrate
on producing goods that enjoy quasi-monopolistic competitive advantages on limited markets.
This is expressed not least in the relatively high concentration of German exports among a small
number of commodity groups in the high-price segment. Yet on such markets, price cuts do not
usually lead immediately to the desired increase in sales. It is only indirectly that their position
improves against related products. A company that is not in price competition generally operates
within constrained market segments. It is usually unable to increase its profits significantly by
reducing its prices. Rather, most of the cost reduction will be translated directly into higher
profitability. The higher rate of return of the plant utilised by the firm prolongs its economic
working life. At the same time, the profitability requirements made of potential new plant are
increased, retarding, ceteris paribus, the investment process, although without negative effects
on the size of the workforce.
However, it must be taken into account that the market situation in which a company finds itself
is seldom independent of its investment activity. On the contrary, in many cases it is precisely
the aim of investment to strengthen the market position of the company and to increase its
degree of independence from price competition. In other words, a company that does not face
price competition will have to invest in order to maintain its competitive advantages in the future.
Unlike a company that faces price competition, it cannot assume that its sales can be increased
indefinitely on existing markets. It is in the nature of such markets tailored to the needs of
individual companies or products, that the number of customers and the volume demanded are
limited. For this reason such companies are forced to open up new market segments by means
of investment. It is only when this is successfully accomplished that the additional profits
resulting from lower costs actually lead to more investment and job creation. The new market
segments need not necessarily lie in the existing areas of production activity and the existing- 16 -
production location. Cost reductions, where it is not oriented exclusively towards an
improvement in the profitability of a single firm, can therefore lead to investment in other
production areas and particularly in other production locations.
 &RVWFXWWLQJDQGVDOHV
Whether and to what extent measures taken with the aim of improving the cost situation at the
micro-level will raise investment and employment at the macroeconomic level also depends on
the reaction of other affected actors in the economy. It is the recognition of these interdepend-
encies within an economy that constitutes an additional important reason for the divergence
between micro and macroeconomic explanations of investment and growth following cost re-
ductions.
At the macroeconomic level these macroeconomic interrelations of a cost reduction on the
various components of effective demand play a key role. Under ceteris paribus conditions,
reduced costs for the business sector inevitably imply income losses for other sectors. A reduc-
tion in the burden of corporate wage costs means, taken by itself, a decline in income for em-
ployee households. This, in turn, generally leads to declining sales due to the ensuing contrac-
tion of private consumption. Within this circular economic mechanism, a negative effect on
investment and growth can only be avoided if either the propensity to save of private households
lastingly declines, or the loss of demand from private consumption is offset by increases in other
demand aggregates.
Comparable demand effects are also induced by government measures. Cuts in public spending
must be implemented to reduce the budget deficit. As a result, planned increases in public
capital spending are cancelled, reducing sales growth for private companies and failing to gen-
erate positive effects for the productivity of private investment. If, in the context of a growing
economy, economically relevant infrastructure is utilised more heavily, firms’ production costs
will tend to increase over the longer-term due to capacity constraints (DIW  1994). The cuts in
many areas of public spending mean that firms’ sales prospects tend to decline. Reduced public
spending on goods and services leads to a direct demand loss, while cuts in social benefits
result in an indirect loss of demand.
Similar considerations apply in the case of the other demand aggregates. If government is suc-
cessful in reducing its budget deficits, government demand for credit declines. The resulting fall
in capital market interest rates could stimulate private investment activity. If this were the case, it
might offset the influence of the substitution effect induced by the slower pace of wage growth.
Yet this is not necessarily to be expected. If the business and the public sector managed to
reduce net borrowing by means of wage moderation, redundancies and cuts in transfers,- 17 -
households must expect income losses, unless the current account surplus increases at the
same time. If this leads to a decline in private consumption, households will save less, even if
the savings-to-income ratio remains unchanged. If the central bank does not pursue an ex-
pansionary monetary policy in this situation, a fall in the supply of capital must be expected, so
that there is no reason to expect  interest rates to decline. If, in addition, the hoped-for im-
provement in the foreign trade balance fails to materialise, from a macroeconomic perspective
the cost-cutting measures themselves are more likely to reduce than to raise sales and em-
ployment.
Consequently, at the macroeconomic level account must be taken of the fact that investment
must adjust to the constraints on financing set by economic interrelations. If the proportion of
self-financed investment remains constant, higher investment is only conceivable if other sectors
of the economy or the "rest of the world" take on additional debt (DIW 1997b). Although it is
undisputed that higher corporate investment is compatible with an unchanged debt position of all
sectors if at the same time output is at a high level, the decisive questions is how this high level
is to be achieved. Relying solely on higher retained profits in the hope that this will lead to more
investment is equivalent to the assumption that the other sectors are prepared to take on
additional debt (DIW 1996a). If this cannot be achieved, a profit-induced increase in investment
is impossible.
 &XWWLQJFRVWVE\SURORQJLQJZRUNLQJOLIH
Two central elements in the cost-cutting strategy discussed here are the plans to reduce the
time spent in higher education and the raising of the retirement age to 67. These strategy ele-
ments exert direct effects on labour supply. In addition, the framework of economic and political
conditions characterising the cost-cutting scenario also influence - primarily by way of migration -
the size of the overall population and therefore the population of working age. Whereas in the
reference scenario net migration of 3.6 million is expected between 1996 and 2010, against the
background of favourable economic development prospects, in the cost-cutting scenario the
economic situation in Germany is rather unfavourable, reducing the "pull effect" of the German
labour market on potential immigrants to a corresponding extent. This is likely to be associated
with a more restrictive immigration policy, so that it was assumed that net migration would be
around 800,000 below that in the reference scenario (Table 2).- 18 -
The ageing of the population will continue largely independently of the extent of immigration:
against the background of the continued increase in life expectancy, the birth rate in west Ger-
many will remain more or less constant, while the low birth rate in eastern Germany will gradu-
ally rise to the west German level. Even so, the reduced immigration in the cost-cutting scenario
serves to accentuate the ageing of the population compared with the reference scenario. Of a
total resident population of 81.5 million (reference scenario 82.4 million), the proportion of the
under 20-year-olds will decline to 18% and the share of the 60-year-olds and over will rise to
26% (Table 3). There will only be a minor decline in the working-age population as a proportion
of the total, although the absolute decline of this group, at 1.6 million, is substantial.
7DEOH
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Reference scenario Cost-cutting scenario
Birth rate :HVW*HUPDQ\
German women: relatively constant with a continued slight increase in the
average age at the first child. The total fertility rate by the cohort 1985
amounted to around 1300.
Foreign women: continued convergence on the fertility patterns of German
women. The total fertility rate in 2010 amounted to 1600.
(DVW*HUPDQ\
German women: Among younger women a "catching-up effect" has begun,
offsetting the very low birth rates in the early 1990s; among middle-aged
women who already have 1 or 2 children, this effect will not occur. More gener-
ally a process of convergence to west German fertility patterns. The cohort
born in 1985 will exhibit the same birth rate in east and west Germany. Over
the period this implies an increase in birth rates, but they will remain below
those in west Germany for a considerable time to come.
Mortality Continued increase in life expectancy in both east and west Germany, with a
narrowing of the existing regional differences in mortality. In 2010 the life ex-
pectancy of German men in west Germany will be 75.1 and of German
women 81.4 years; in east Germany the figures will be 74.2 and 80.4 years
respectively. In purely statistical terms the figures for foreigners are slightly
higher: this is due to the fact that the old and the sick tend to return to their
country of origin.
Migration Net migration for the period 1996-2010 is as follows:
Germans:           0.95 million           0.80 million
Foreigners:         2.62 million           1.99 million
Participation
rates
Participation rates will increase in both scenarios thanks to the impact of the
Growth and Employment-promotion Act. On top of this comes the fact that the
trend towards higher participation rates among west German women will con-
tinue. For east German women two scenarios of future participation rates were
calculated.
In addition the normal retirement age
is raised to 67 years.
                                             ',:- 19 -
The decline in the working-age population cannot be expected to ease pressure on the labour
market, however, as it will be more than compensated for by changes in participation behaviour
patterns. In the cost-cutting scenario it is assumed that the duration of higher education studies
is cut markedly, student fees are raised significantly and the number of places in higher educa-
tion cut back to a far greater extent than in the reference scenario. On top of this comes an
increase in the retirement age in stages to 67 for both men and women.
The changes within higher education imply both that the proportion of school leaders com-
mencing studies will decline and that those graduating from universities and colleges will, due to
the shorter duration of studies, be available to the labour market at an earlier stage. The
Conference of Federal State Ministers responsible for education (Kultusministerkonferenz) has
produced estimates of higher education trends (new students, students and graduates) to the
year 2015 (KMK 1996). In the middle status-quo variant, in which the average study period is




1991 1995 Reference- Cost-cutting
scenario scenario
in millions
Population 80,3 81,8 82,4 81,5
Age structure in %
0-20 years 21,5 21,5 18,3 18,3
20-60 years 58,0 57,4 55,8 55,7
60 years and older 20,4 21,0 25,9 26,1
Foreigners as a % of the population 7,6 9,0 13,7 13,0
Cumulative migrations
 2)
Immigration - - 13,4 12,6
Emigration - - 9,8 9,8
Net migration - - 3,6 2,8
of which:
      Nationals - - 0,9 0,8
      Foreigners - - 2,6 2,0
Cumulative net natural
population movements
Nationals - - -4,3 -4,3
Foreigners - - 1,3 1,3
Total - - -3,0 -3,1
1) Excluding naturalisations. - 2) 1996 to 2010.
6RXUFHV: Statistisches Bundesamt; DIW Scenario Model.                                             ',:- 20 -
total of 2.2 million students are expected in 2010. If, on the other hand, it proved possible to
reduce study periods to four and a half years at university and four years at college, the number
of students in 2010 would, at 1.6 million, be significantly lower than in the reference scenario.
The reduction in the duration of studies serves primarily to raise labour market participation rates
among the 25-30 year-olds, as the average age of graduates amounts to around 28 years.
Overall, the participation rates of those aged under 30 will be significantly higher in the cost-
cutting than in the reference scenario.
Given the financial problems expected to be encountered by the pension insurance scheme as a
result of demographic trends, discussions have begun on a further increase in the normal
retirement age, i.e. the age at which employees can retire without suffering deductions from their
pension entitlements. The most frequent proposal is for an increase in the retirement age to 67.
Also under discussion are changes in the mode of calculating pension entitlements and further
reductions in benefit levels. In the cost-cutting scenario it is assumed that a bundle of measures
is taken to ensure the viability of the pension system, with only moderate increases in the
contribution rate to the pension insurance scheme, and that the normal retirement age is raised
to 67.
The Growth and Employment-Promotion Act that came into force at the start of 1997 has al-
ready brought in numerous changes in pension laws (BfA 1996). The previous retirement age for
the unemployed (starting in 1997) and for women (starting in 2000) is being raised in 60 monthly
steps from 60 to 65; the retirement age for those with the full number of contribution-years is to
be raised (starting in 2000) from its current level of 63 to 65 in 24 monthly steps. These changes
have been incorporated into the reference scenario. In the cost-cutting scenario it is assumed
that additional measures are taken, leading to a further increase in the retirement age to 67. The
increase in the age limit could be achieved by raising the minimum retirement age to 62 (an
option that, as currently for those retiring at 60, would lead to deductions from pension
entitlement), or by permitting people to retire at 60, as is currently the case, but imposing more
stringent deductions. In the latter case the maximum deduction from the unemployment pension
and women’s pension would be 25.2 per cent. The maximum deduction per month would, with
respect to the pension levels prevailing in the first half of 1997 amount to around DM 465 in west
and DM 382 in east Germany (in each case assuming 40 contribution years) Such deductions -
just as the alternative of increasing the earliest possible retirement age to 62 - would be
expected to induce more people to remain in employment for longer.
Currently participation rates decline significantly well before the standard retirement age. For
instance, in west Germany in 1995, less than half of (German) men aged 60 were employed,
around 40% of those aged 61 and just a third of those aged 62 (StaBua 1996). This is because
of the opportunities available to retire early due to unemployment or entitlement to a full or partial- 21 -
occupational disability pension. Thus the financial burden on the pension insurance scheme can
only be effectively reduced if the conditions for entitlement to occupational disability pensions are
also changed. The planned reform of these pensions (Seidel 1997), under which the
occupationally specific disability pension is to be more or less scrapped and entitlement to a
pension due to reduced work capacity restricted, was incorporated into the reference scenario.
In the cost-cutting scenario it is assumed that the reform is implemented more rapidly and the
definition of "reduced work capacity" is interpreted far more rigorously. These changes in
pension law are coupled with lower income growth, lower wage growth and a reduced pension
level compared with the reference scenario. It is therefore to be expected that there will be a
significantly greater number of people who will be forced to continue working, or to take on work
to top up their pension entitlement, in order to make ends meet. The participation rate will thus
be higher than in the reference scenario, particularly among the 65-69 year-olds (Table 4).
Comparing participation rates with those prevailing in the 1960s or 1970s, it seems that there is
considerable scope for raising participation rates once more. Although participation rates had
been falling before the start of the 1970s (when the flexible retirement age limit was introduced),
they were still twice as high for the 60-64 year-olds and four times as high among the 65-69
year-olds than in the 1990s. Even allowing for the fact that, in the context of a labour shortage,
employers were keen to retain elderly employees, and these were also forced to work longer
because the financial constraints were greater then than they are today, the participation rates
prevailing at that time do illustrate the substantial potential in this area: in west Germany alone,
half a million more German males between the ages of 60 and 74 would now be in employment
under the participation-rate conditions prevailing in 1972.
As a result of the changes in participation behaviour, the labour force in the year 2010 will, at
42.3 million, be 800,000 higher in the cost-cutting than in the reference scenario; this is in spite
of the fact that the population will be 900,000 below that in the reference scenario. In other




Age groups Reference scenario Cost-cutting-
scenario
male female male female male female male female
Participation rates in selected age groups in %
West Germany
15 - 20 40,7 34,8 34,8 28,2 36,2 31,3 40,5 35,0
20 - 25 77,8 73,4 75,7 68,7 76,7 69,8 82,4 72,5
25 - 30 86,8 70,8 86,0 72,5 86,6 75,6 90,4 77,1
60 - 65 35,0 12,2 33,0 13,0 67,9 19,0 71,9 30,1
65 - 70 8,2 3,8 7,3 3,3 17,8 4,8 21,3 7,5
70 - 75 4,9 2,1 4,2 2,1 4,6 1,8 3,2 0,8
East Germany
15 - 20 59,6 46,3 40,5 30,4 35,2 32,4 40,3 35,0
20 - 25 88,9 87,2 86,5 81,0 75,4 72,9 82,1 74,3
25 - 30 96,2 96,2 93,1 90,7 85,5 79,8 90,1 79,8
60 - 65 26,8 4,8 15,7 3,3 67,1 18,4 72,2 30,7
65 - 70 3,4 1,2 3,0 -  4,3 3,6 20,2 7,2
70 - 75 -  -  -  -  -  -  0,9 - 
 Labour force  in thousands
West Germany
15 - 30 5 143 4 171 4 484 3 643 3 989 3 275 4 233 3 378
30 - 60 12 628 8 256 13 384 9 283 14 058 9 918 14 104 10 008
60 a. over  800  362  768  361 1 712  520 1 797  757
Total 18 571 12 789 18 636 13 287 19 759 13 714 20 134 14 143
East Germany
15 - 30 1 341 1 231 1 111  924 1 023  900 1 051  899
30 - 60 3 097 2 909 3 100 2 919 3 331 2 371 3 193 2 356
60 a. over  117  33  82  23  288  93  368  161
Total 4 555 4 173 4 293 3 866 4 642 3 365 4 611 3 416
Germany
15 - 30 6 484 5 402 5 595 4 567 5 012 4 176 5 284 4 277
30 - 60 15 725 11 165 16 484 12 202 17 388 12 289 17 297 12 365
60 a. over  917  395  850  384 2 001  613 2 164  918
Total 23 126 16 962 22 929 17 153 24 401 17 078 24 745 17 559
6RXUFHV: Mikrozensus (representative sample survey); DIW prognoses.                                 ',:- 23 -
means that the structure of the labour force will shift in favour of elderly workers. By the year
2010 the proportion of the workforce aged over 60 will have doubled.- 24 -
 5HVXOWV
 2XWSXWDQGHPSOR\PHQW
In order to evaluate the overall effects on output and employment of the assumptions bundled in
the cost-cutting scenario, compared to the situation in 2010 in the reference scenario, we turn
first to the results of the capital-vintage model. The main task is to determine the growth
trajectory of the business sector (excluding housing rental), which constitutes an exogenous
variable for the calculations in the capital-vintage model. For its part, the capital-vintage model
provides figures on domestic demand for investment goods and productivity, along with essential
components enabling the overall path of potential output growth to be estimated.
On the basis of the qualitative evaluation of growth impulses given in section 3, and allowing for
the interdependent relationships between investment and aggregate demand, and between
investment and productivity, the growth trajectory for the business sector (excluding housing
rental) can be determined. Most important in this context is the estimation of the impact of a
cost-cutting strategy on private consumption and the external position.
Given the trajectory of collectively agreed wage rates and indirect labour costs assumed in the
cost-cutting scenario, unit labour costs are expected to decline across the entire prognosis
period. On average this decline will amount to more than 1 per cent per annum in west Germany
and around 2 per cent in east Germany. Germany’s price competitiveness vis-a-vis the rest of
the world will only temporarily improve to the same extent, however. Given that German wage
trends are taken as an indicator within the EU, wage settlements in other Member States will
also be moderate, causing Germany’s cost advantages over its most important trading partners
to melt away.
In addition the restrictions on public spending lead to a relative deterioration in the qualitative
conditions of Germany as a production location, particularly in the areas of infrastructure and
education. In the longer-term this poses a threat to its lead in terms of quality competition,
particularly over the newly industrialising and central and east European countries. For this
reason only moderate export growth to the year 2010 of around 3 per cent per annum is
expected, compared to 4 percent in the reference scenario. The cost-cutting strategy will be
relatively successful in limiting imports, however. Taken together, there will be a substantial
increase in the foreign trade surplus in real terms. However, the foreign-trade impulses on the
domestic economy will be significantly weaker than in the reference scenario.
The increasing demand impulses from abroad will have a positive effect on the domestic
economy. This would have a favourable effect on the demand for investment goods and in- 25 -
particular for private consumption. On top of this, privatisation will lead to a shift away from
government in favour of private consumption. An additional positive effect is expected to emerge
from the reduced incentives for moonlighting resulting from the lower indirect labour costs.
However, these growth impulses will be almost completely offset by the weak development of
mass purchasing power resulting from the unfavourable development of private household
disposable income. In sum, therefore, private consumption can only be expected to expand by
around 2 per cent per annum in the cost-cutting scenario. This growth rate is one half of a
percentage point below that in the reference scenario.
Bringing together these various influences, it is expected that gross value added in the business
sector (excluding housing rental) would increase by 2 per cent per annum in the cost-cutting
scenario, taking the depressed level of 1995 as a starting point. In the reference scenario, by
contrast, in which the positive impact of government activities and higher investment boost
demand, the growth rate reaches almost 3 per cent.
The slower pace of wage growth leads to changes in factor inputs only in the case of new plant.
A flattening out of the increase in capital intensity and thus also of labour productivity
consequently occurs only after significant time lags. Even so, by the year 2010 it is to be
expected that because of the slower pace of real wage growth, potential capital intensity in west
Germany will increase by almost one half of a percentage point more slowly than in the
reference scenario (1.6 compared to 2.0 per cent). The growth of labour productivity is
weakened to a roughly corresponding extent (Table 5). However, on balance the number of jobs
created by investment activity will be lower than in the reference scenario, because investment
growth will be weaker in the light of the slow growth of demand.
In eastern Germany an even more pronounced weakening of the rate of labour productivity
growth is to be expected. Whereas until now firms have expected a rapid adjustment of east
German to west German wage levels, in the cost-cutting scenario east Germany is to be
irrevocably classified as a low-wage region as far as the investment calculations of firms are
concerned. The growth of labour productivity in the cost-cutting scenario will accordingly be far
weaker than in the reference scenario. On balance the impact on employment is negative. The
specialisation on relatively low value-added products, produced at low wages with low labour
productivity, means that this region will be unable to serve attractive, expanding market to the
same extent as west Germany.
For Germany as a whole the annual average growth of potential labour productivity under the
conditions of the cost-cutting scenario will, at 1.7 per cent, be less than in the reference scenario
(2.4 per cent), but this weakening will be considerably less pronounced than the gap in real
wage growth between the two scenarios (an annual average of 1.3 percentage points). This- 26 -
reflects the time lags inherent in the investment process, and is one of the reasons why the job
effects of factor substitution are insufficient to offset the employment-reducing impact of weaker










Gross fixed capital DM billions 6 177 6 862 10 413 9 466
Capital productivity 3) DM thousands 451 431 414 406
Potential output DM billions 2 786 2 955 4 308 3 839
Gross value added DM billions 2 429 2 576 3 872 3 443
Capacity utilisation % 87 87 90 90
Capital intensity 4) DM thousands 178 212 313 289
Productivity per job 5) DM thousands 80 91 129 117
Jobs in millions 34,8 32,4 33,3 32,7
Employees in millions 29,1 27,6 30,0 29,5
Job-fill density % 84 85 90 90
Labour productivity 6) DM thousands 83 93 129 117
Annual average change on previous period
Gross fixed capital % - 2,7 2,8 2,2
Capital productivity % - -1,2 -0,3 -0,4
Potential output % - 1,5 2,5 1,8
Gross value added % - 1,5 2,8 2,0
Capital intensity % - 4,5 2,6 2,1
Productivity per job % - 3,3 2,4 1,7
Jobs % - -1,8 0,2 0,1
Employees % - -1,3 0,6 0,4
Labour productivity % - 2,8 2,2 1,5
1) Excluding housing rental,- 2) At 1995 prices.- 3) Potential output per 1000 units of gross fixed
capital.- 4) Gross fixed capital per job.- 5) Potential output per job.- 6) Gross value added per
employee.
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistics Office; DIW potential output calculation and scenario model.            
                                                                                                                                  ',: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The economic policy concepts depicted in both the scenarios lead to a marked acceleration of
economic growth over the longer term (Table 6). In the reference scenario the German economy
as a whole is expected to grow at an annual average rate of almost 2.5 per cent to the year
2010. The growth dynamic is perceptibly weaker in the cost-cutting scenario. With annual
average growth rates of 1.7 per cent, however, the pace of growth is relatively high compared
with the 1980s.
The achievement of a relatively high growth path in the cost-cutting scenario is conditional on
decisive changes in the behavioural patterns of firms and households. It requires, for example,
that firms pass on to a considerable extent the reductions in their wage cost burden in the form
of lower prices. This implies that the price level would have to remain constant on average
between 1995 and 2010 (Table 7). It also requires that households lastingly increase their
propensity to consume, while the savings-to-income ratio would have to decline from its current
level of 12 per cent to 9 per cent.
The main reasons for the lower growth trajectory in the cost-cutting compared to the reference
scenario lie in the reduced impulses from government demand and private-sector demand for
investment goods. Whereas in the reference scenario government consumption and public
capital spending increase by between 1 and 2 percentage points each year, in the cost-cutting
scenario both variables remain virtually constant. In the case of private-sector investment
(excluding housing rental), annual growth of almost 3 per cent in the reference scenario
contrasts with growth of just 1.5 per cent in the cost-cutting scenario. The dampening of
investment demand is explained largely by the reduced extent to which capital is substituted for
labour in response to wage moderation.
Taking the prognosis period as a whole, the cost-cutting measures are associated with highly
significant welfare losses compared to the reference scenario. Whereas in the reference
scenario per capita GDP at constant prices rises from DM 38,000 in 1995 to more than DM
60,000 in 2010, less than DM 55,000 is achieved in the cost-cutting scenario. This means that
realisation of the conditions contained in the cost-cutting scenario implies a loss of income
growth of an order of magnitude corresponding roughly to the total growth achieved in west










Private consumption 1 861 1 975 2 845 2 667
Government consumption 626 675 815 695
Investment 717 751 1 104 898
   Government 84 87 126 87
   Housing construction 195 260 352 306
   Business 2) 438 404 626 505
Changes in inventories 5 28 20 20
Net exports 55 29 181 170
   Exports 771 817 1 511 1 337
   Imports 716 788 1 330 1 167
GDP 3 264 3 458 4 965 4 450
   West Germany 2 965 3 077 4 206 3 868
   East Germany 299 381 759 582
Annual average change on previous period in %
Private consumption - 1,5 2,5 2,0
Government consumption - 1,9 1,3 0,2
Investment - 1,2 2,6 1,2
   Government - 0,9 2,5 0,0
   Housing construction - 7,5 2,0 1,1
   Business 2) - -2,0 3,0 1,5
Changes in inventories - - - -
Net exports - - - -
   Exports - 1,5 4,2 3,3
   Imports - 2,4 3,6 2,7
GDP - 1,4 2,4 1,7
   West Germany - 0,9 2,1 1,5
   East Germany - 6,2 4,7 2,9
1) At 1995 prices,- 2) Excluding housing rental.                       
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistics Office; DIW scenario model',:- 29 -
The failure to exploit the potential for economic growth has a negative effect on the catching-up
process in east Germany. Whereas per capita GDP in east Germany rises from DM 25,000 in









Price index 1995 = 100
GDP 87 100 137 102
Private consumption 88 100 133 102
Government consumption 89 100 140 103
Investment 92 100 139 103
Exports 94 100 130 101
Imports 102 100 122 101
Annual average change on previous period in %
GDP - 3,5 2,1 0,2
Private consumption - 3,2 1,9 0,1
Government consumption - 3,0 2,3 0,2
Investment - 2,1 2,2 0,2
Exports - 1,6 1,7 0,1
Imports - -0,5 1,3 0,1
memo items:
West Germany
Price index of GDP - 2,9 2,1 0,2
Adjusted gross wage share - -0,5 -0,3 -1,1
Individual gross wage income 1) - 3,8 3,4 0,2
Labour productivity 2) - 1,5 1,6 1,2
Unit labour costs - 2,3 1,8 -1,1
East Germany
Price index of GDP - 9,7 2,3 0,1
Adjusted gross wage share - -6,2 -1,4 -1,9
Individual gross wage income 1) - 14,9 5,0 0,7
Labour productivity 2) - 10,0 4,4 2,9
Unit labour costs - 2,1 0,8 -2,1
1) Gross wage and salary income per employee.- 2) GDP at 1995 prices per employed person.
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistics Office; DIW scenario model.                                                ',:- 30 -
the cost-cutting scenario. Thus in this scenario, in the year 2010 the level of income in eastern
Germany is more than 30 per cent below that in west Germany.
Moreover, it is not only regional differences that remain more pronounced in the cost-cutting
scenario. It is also to be expected that the disparities in the functional and personal distribution
of income will also be wider. Wage income, for example, will continue to decline sharply as a
proportion of GDP, despite the fact that the wage share in Germany is already below the west
European average. Wages decline from around 61 per cent of GDP in 1995 to just 50 percent in
2010 (Table 8), which would imply a renewed acceleration of the pace of income redistribution
compared with the period since the start of the 1980s.
On top of this come the cutbacks in the transfer benefits to private households. Hardest hit by
such cuts are recipients of minimum social benefit, the unemployed and pensioners. It is
therefore to be expected that in the cost-cutting scenario broad sections of the population would
not only miss out on real income growth, they would actually suffer serious income losses.
A continuation of the decline in wages as a share of output is also expected in the reference
scenario. The pace of this decline will be significantly slower than in the past, however. Under
the conditions prevailing in this scenario the wage share would amount to 57 per cent in 2010.
Even so, given average real wage increases of around 1.5 per cent, most employee households
will benefit from the growth process.
Restructuring processes in the area of social transfers are also expected in the reference
scenario, resulting primarily from the shift in the age structure of the population. However, taken
as a whole these changes will not serve to "decouple" social transfers from net wage trends.
Consequently, in the case of personal income distribution, too, differentials can be expected to
be markedly less pronounced in the reference than in the cost-cutting scenario.- 31 -
 7KHSXEOLFVHFWRU
Assumptions regarding the extent and nature of public sector activity are clearly reflected in the
figures for government revenues and spending; together with more general economic trends,











GNP 2 882 3 445 6 845 4 541
Depreciation 362 453 987 657
Indirect taxes minus subsidies 261 364 940 630
Indirect taxes 358 447 1029 675
Subsidies 98 83 89 45
Gross wage income 1 612 1 876 3 481 2 010
Social insurance contributions 491 608 1 071 602
Taxes on wages 221 294 559 298
Net income 900 973 1851 1 110
Gross income from profits 648 752 1 437 1 244
memo items:
Indirect taxes as % of private consumption 22,0 22,6 27,2 24,7
Subsidies as % of GDP 4,4 3,1 1,6 1,2
Social insurance contributions as % of gross 30,5 32,4 30,8 29,9
Wage taxes as % of gross wage income 13,7 15,7 16,0 14,8
Taxes on profits as % of income from profits 15,7 10,6 10,8 10,1
Gross wage income as % of GDP 62,2 60,6 56,9 50,3
1) After deducting government consumption.-  2) Adjusted.
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistics Office; DIW scenario model.                                                ',:- 32 -
In the reference scenario government plays an active role in modernising the production loca-
tion. This involves additional spending, both current and capital. The volume of gross investment
will almost double compared with 1995. The growth of public capital spending is limited
exclusively to west Germany, whereas in eastern Germany investment is maintained at its
present high level. Despite the additional spending, in the reference scenario public spending will











Revenues 1 165 1 430 2 814 1 700
Indirect taxes 358 447 1 029 675
Social insurance contributions 491 608 1 071 602
Taxes on wages 221 294 559 298
Taxes on profits 95 81 154 125
Expenditure 1 301 1 547 2 852 1 789
Gross capital spending 75 87 175 89
Provision of public services 2) 537 649 1092 679
Social transfers 428 556 1115 751
Transfers in support of entrepreneurial 5) 149 114 133 67
Transfers to rest of the world 66 53 200 87
Interest payments 4) 47 88 137 116
Fiscal deficit -136 -117 -39 -89
memo items:
Governments revenues as % of GDP 40,8 41,4 41,2 37,3
Government expenditure as % of GDP 45,6 44,7 41,8 39,3
Deficit as % of GDP -4,8 -3,4 -0,6 -2,0
Net debt as % of GDP 5) 38,9 48,2 37,3 64,4
1) Central, state and local government, social insurance and supplementary budgets
(Treuhandanstalt, rail, east German housing sector).- 2) Government consumption minus
depreciation.- 3) Subsidies and investment grants.- 4) Interest payments minus earnings from
property.- 5) Liabilities minus claims.
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistics Office; DIW scenario model.                                                ',:- 33 -
The growth process initiated by government activities will generate additional government
revenues even in the absence of tax changes. Beyond this, the reference scenario assumes an
increase in the burden of indirect taxation. As a result, in the longer-term the annual public bor-
rowing requirement can be reduced to below DM 40 billion, despite higher public spending.
Thanks to the induced growth process, it is possible to reduce the borrowing requirement to
below 1 per cent of GDP. In consequence, the relative burden of interest payments on govern-
ment budgets declines perceptibly.
In the cost-cutting scenario government attempts to reduce the burden of taxes and contribu-
tions on firms and households by limiting spending at all levels of government and in virtually all
spending areas. Compared with 1995, spending on service provision and public investment
remain virtually constant in nominal terms. Subsidies are cut back markedly, falling by almost
two thirds as a proportion of GDP by the year 2010. Additional spending is only to be expected
on social transfers, reflecting the continued rise in the number of benefit recipients. The overall
effect is a decline in public spending as a share of GDP of more than five percentage points by
the year 2010 (39 percent) compared with 1995.
At the same time taxes and contributions will fall by almost 3.5 percentage points of GDP. Both
the burden of taxes on profits and the proportion of social insurance contributions borne by
companies will be reduced. Although employees will pay higher social insurance contributions,
total contributions will decline by 2.5 percentage points of gross wage and salary income com-
pared with 1995. On the other hand, employee households will benefit from a reduced burden of
taxes on wages. Over the next 15 years wage tax receipts will fall by a more than 1 percentage
point of wage income. Despite an increase in value added tax of two percentage points on the
1995 level, the deficit can only be reduced to around DM 90 billion. The annual public borrowing
requirement declines to 2 per cent of GDP.
It cannot be claimed that comprehensive fiscal consolidation would be achieved by the meas-
ures summarised in the cost-cutting scenario. Despite the efforts to cut spending, outstanding
government debt will increase markedly. Net government debt will rise from 48 percent of GDP
in 1995 to 64 percent in 2010. The scope for government action would be further constrained by
a continued increase in the burden of interest payments. The debt problem would be particularly
serious for state and local governments in eastern Germany, as the increase in outstanding debt
is not matched by a corresponding improvement in economic performance.
 (PSOR\PHQWDQGWKHODERXUPDUNHW
As far as the central economic and social policy problem, that of mass unemployment, is con-
cerned, a cost-cutting strategy does not produce the desired results (Table 10), although the- 34 -
volume of employment rises significantly to the year 2010. The employment impulses in the
cost-cutting scenario emanate from the private sector, and more than offset the job losses in the
public sector. The greater part of the job creation effects in the private sector is directly due to
the weakening of the capital intensification of production induced by the slower pace of wage
growth. This leads to a significantly slower rate of productivity growth, which (per employee-
hour) amounts to an average of around 2 per cent per annum during the prognosis period. The
employment-intensity of economic growth increases accordingly. Over the period 1995-2010
employment is expected to rise by around 1.6 million.
Yet this increase in the number of wage-earners is not reflected in a decline in unemployment.
The reason for this does not lie in the immigration from abroad of people of working age. Indeed,
it is to be expected in the cost-cutting scenario that immigration will slow compared with the first
half of the 1990s. Rather, the reason for the increase in the labour supply is to be found in the
cost-cutting strategy itself, which serves to prolong working life, in particular by shortening higher
education study periods and postponing retirement. In 2010 these measures will increase
potential labour supply in Germany by around 1.7 million in persons.
Under the conditions prevailing in the cost-cutting scenario, the extent of the excess supply of
labour in the year 2010 will, at 7 million people, be of a similar order of magnitude to that in
1995. At just under 9 per cent of the workforce, registered unemployment will, however, be
slightly below the current level, as people are forced out of the labour force and into various
forms of hidden unemployment: pressure to leave the labour market is likely to be particularly
strong in east Germany, and there especially among women.
In the reference scenario, too, the goal of overcoming mass unemployment will probably still be
a long way off in 2010, although the extent of excess labour supply will have been significantly
reduced. The increase in employment is expected to be around 1 million persons higher than in
the cost-cutting scenario, implying an increase of 2.6 million persons on the 1995 figure.
For the reference scenario the labour market statistics indicate a decline in the excess supply of
labour of almost 1.7 million persons compared with 1995 by the year 2010, despite the higher
incidence of immigration and cross-border commuting. Registered unemployment is expected to










Employment in Germany 36 511 34 868 37 500 36 500
Net cross-border commuters -53 4 155 125
Resident population in em- 36 564 34 864 37 345 36 375
Labour supply 41 081 41 855 42 626 43 474
Excess labour surplus 4 517 6 991 5 281 7 099
   Registered unemployment 2 602 3 614 2 711 3 562
   Hidden unemployment 1 915 3 377 2 570 3 537
memo item:
Unemployment rate in % 1) 6,6 9,4 6,8 8,9
   West Germany 5,5 9,0 6,2 8,4
   East Germany 10,7 14,0 9,3 11,2
1) Registered unemployment in relation to registered unemployment plus residents in em-
ployment.
6RXUFHV: Federal Statistical Office; Labour supply calculations by the IAB; DIW Scenario model.
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The positive connotations attached to the concept of "cost-cutting" quickly lose their attraction
when, as is frequently the case, this goal is seen as a comprehensive concept of reducing
spending in all sectors of the economy. In such a context cost-cutting does not aim merely to
reduce avoidable costs, in the sense of raising efficiency and productivity, but rather amounts, in
the final analysis, to a defensive restructuring of the entire economy. As justified as many of the
demands may be from a microeconomic perspective, at the macro level a rigorous and
comprehensive strategy of cost-cutting is ill-suited to resolving the problems facing Germany ‘s
labour market. Indeed, there is a real danger that the prime target, that of reducing the burden of
costs with respect to output, will not in fact be finally achieved at the end of the day.
A much more promising strategy would involve adopting an offensive approach to resolving
Germany's economic problems. The strategy of improving the conditions for growth establishes
the prerequisites for higher incomes and is more likely to help reduce over-supply on the labour
market. In such a strategy, cost-cutting does not result from cutting spending, but by achieving
growth while simultaneously raising efficiency, and thus raising the incomes of all participants.- 37 -
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